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Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli,
and Alberto Giovannini
Why the Need for Microstructure?
Exchange rate economics has made progress since the start of the general-
ized floating regime in 1973. Much research has appeared, explaining im-
portant phenomena in the behavior of exchange rates, and using an ever larger
set of data to test such explanations. Research in recent years has even refined
our theoretical understanding, as well as the empirical analysis, of the dynam-
ics of exchange rates within bands and the determinants of realignments.
The key theoretical insight of all recent research on exchange rates is the so-
called asset market approach. The foreign exchange market is seen no longer
as a market where the flow supply and demand over time determine the equilib-
rium price—as in the case of perishable agricultural goods—but as a market
where price is determined by expectations of income that can be generated by
holding assets denominated in a certain foreign currency.
The asset market approach was prompted by the observation that much of
the fluctuation in foreign exchange rates is difficult to reconcile with the net
flows of goods and capital that occur between countries. These fluctuations
appear to be associated with political and economic news that, rather than af-
fecting current flows, signals possible future changes in the value of the cur-
rency.
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The asset market approach to exchange rates has produced a number of
models that have proved useful in explaining and quantifying exchange rate
movements. The first characteristic of these models is that they are macro mod-
els; that is, they are highly aggregated. They attempt to capture and make ex-
plicit all determinants of the demand for and supply of foreign exchange, in-
cluding those that are quite outside the foreign exchange market per se. Given
this general macro approach, the focus of the models is on financial asset mar-
kets, and therefore the emphasis is on the behavior of agents in these asset
markets.
There is a tension between the all-encompassing macro approach and the
need to highlight the dynamics of asset markets. How is this tension resolved?
It is resolved with the adoption of simplifying assumptions on asset markets,
not uncommon in the finance literature, that it is useful to spell out.
Agents are identical. Information is perfect. Trading is costless. Although
models that relax them exist, these assumptions can be thought of as the hall-
mark of the asset approach to macroeconomic models of exchange rates.
1
The most important implication of these assumptions is the absence of an
explanation for trading in assets. Thus, asset prices adjust every period (or
every instant) to make agents content with the specified amount of assets in
their portfolios. The adjustment of asset prices instantaneously reflects the ar-
rival of new information in the marketplace, which all participants observe and
interpret in the same way. Hence, the basic macro model of the exchange rate
implies that all information pertaining to the current and future "fundamental"
determinants of exchange rates, that is, all information that implies a current
and/or future change in the return on assets denominated in different currenc-
ies, has an immediate and unambiguous effect on exchange rates.
Why study foreign exchange market microstructure? The interest in the
working of the foreign exchange markets stems, at least in part, from some of
the problems that the asset market macro models have displayed. The first is a
prima facie contradiction between the models and reality. As noted, such mod-
els imply the absence of trading in assets. By contrast, one of the most im-
portant empirical facts about the foreign exchange market is the high volume
of transactions that occur daily.
2 This inconsistency raises the question of
whether the failure of the standard models to account for the volume of foreign
1. Of course, there are models that relax some of these assumptions. In particular, the perfect
information assumption has been modified by authors who have studied the implications of imper-
fect information on the dynamics of monetary policy disturbances and authors who have studied
the implications of asymmetric information or differences in prior beliefs.
2. The most recent triennial surveys of the foreign exchange markets were conducted in April
1995. The Bank of England (1995) announced a 60 percent increase in trading volume over the
preceding three years, to the level of $464 billion per day, in London; the Federal Reserve (1995)
announced a 46 percent increase in volume in New York over the preceding three years, to the
level of $244 billion a day; and the Bank of Japan announced a 34.3 percent increase, to the level
of $161.4 billion, in Tokyo. The rate of increase in the major centers suggests that the current
worldwide total is now in the vicinity of $1,300 billion a day.Introduction
exchange transactions is a symptom of more serious problems, which might
cause the lack of success at explaining other empirical phenomena on which
researchers have concentrated.
These empirical phenomena include the behavior of excess returns in the
foreign exchange market, the near total inability to predict exchange rates at
short horizons, the inability to explain exchange rate movements even ex post,
and the volatility of exchange rates. Standard models have been unable to ex-
plain these phenomena satisfactorily. In particular, asset pricing formulas im-
plicit in the standard macro models seem, to date, to have fared poorly. For
example, even though the existence of ex ante (i.e., forecastable) returns in the
foreign exchange markets can in theory be explained as risk premia, the esti-
mated returns in practice do not match what is predicted by asset pricing mod-
els based on the covariances among asset returns.
Furthermore, models seem to have a difficult time predicting future move-
ments in exchange rates, suggesting that the information contained in the
macro variables that are usually included in these models is of limited value.
Finally, the volatility of these macro variables is generally smaller than the
observed volatility of exchange rates, suggesting that—unless certain variables
have especially strong effects on the spot exchange rate, as, for example, in the
case of large overshooting in reaction to monetary disturbances—the informa-
tion affecting exchange rate movements may be in part extraneous to the vari-
ables belonging to standard macroeconomic models. Theories of rational spec-
ulative bubbles and speculative attacks can in one sense account for the
existence of excess volatility. But they are inherently unsatisfying in that they
have nothing to say about how or when such bubbles and attacks get started or
how they end.
It is only natural to ask whether these empirical problems of the standard
exchange rate models—problems that stem from the assumptions on asset
market equilibrium—might be solved if the structure of foreign exchange mar-
kets was to be specified in a more realistic fashion. This suggests a sort of
micro-foundations approach to the foreign exchange markets, according to
which a more satisfactory description of the foreign exchange market micro-
structure might help sort out some of the problems displayed by existing
macro models.
Thus, we have established one reason to study foreign exchange market mi-
crostructure: the dissatisfaction with the empirical performance of standard
models. While we find this motivation perfectly justified, and while a research
project that attempts to fix the empirical problems mentioned above by adopt-
ing a richer description of the foreign exchange markets is interesting, we also
believe that it is uncertain of success. The excess volatility problem and the
difficulty of explaining ex ante rates of return also characterize other financial
markets, such as, for example, the stock market. These markets, however,
are organized in a way that differs significantly from the foreign exchange
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stantial regulation. The fact that similar empirical problems surface in
markets having microstructures that differ in some ways makes it less likely
that microstructure-based models will help explain away these empirical prob-
lems. On the other hand, the markets also have some similarities, which might
hold the key to the problem.
A second reason to study market microstructure is only loosely related to
the first. Like any market, the foreign exchange market is an interesting subject
for research that attempts to identify the economic effects of its organization.
This is, as opposed to the macroeconomic approach to foreign exchange micro-
structure, the microeconomic approach. The questions that are addressed with
this approach include, for example, transparency, decentralization, the use of
brokers (vs. marketmakers, vs. auctioneers), the location of trading, the effi-
ciency of clearing of foreign exchange transactions, the relation between spot
and derivative markets, and the importance of systemic risk in the market.
Both the ambitious macro approach to the foreign exchange market and the
less ambitious but equally interesting micro approach represent good reasons
to take stock of the state of research on the microstructure of the foreign ex-
change market. We believe that this field of research is beginning to grow tre-
mendously, and we hope that a systematic look at its progress represents a
useful addition to the literature on the foreign exchange market.
The Chapters in Part I
The study of market microstructure has already produced at least one empir-
ical regularity: the high intraday correlation of trading volume and volatility.
As noted above, standard macroeconomic exchange rate models have little
hope of explaining trading volume. Typically, they assume homogeneity of
market participants. If all traders are the same, why should they trade? Of
course, the standard models do not attempt to explain volume, considering it of
little relevance except to those who make their living trading. But the observed
correlation between volume and volatility suggests something of more general
interest. Frankel and Froot (1990b), for example, find a high contemporaneous
correlation between volume and volatility. They also find some evidence that
dispersion of traders' forecasts, as reflected in survey data, Granger-causes
both volume and volatility.
Given that trading volume seems to be relevant, there are two possible broad
interpretations. One is that the market is processing information in an efficient
way. Here, efficient is not to be understood as in the narrowest definition of the
efficient markets hypothesis, where all traders are homogeneous, all informa-
tion is instantly and fully reflected in the market price, and there are no profits
to be made by trading. Rather, the microstructure perspective presupposes het-
erogeneity, is often based (more specifically) on asymmetric information, and
allows that relatively more skillful or informed traders may succeed at the ex-
pense of those who are less skillful or less informed or of customers who must
transact because they need to eliminate exposure ("liquidity traders"). The firstIntroduction
interpretation is simply that the market works to aggregate the individual bits
of information available to each trader in a relatively rapid and smooth way.
The chapters here shed light on a number of leading models of asymmetric
information and the need for liquidity.
What constitutes information in the foreign exchange market is less obvious
than it is in the equity market, where, for example, individual analysts have
information on individual corporations. But, in much of the work in this book,
orders from customers (especially nonfinancial corporations) constitute the
bits of information to which some traders have access and others do not. Lyons
(1995) follows the behavior of a particular marketmaker over the course of five
days.
3 Lyons sheds some light on how bits of such information are processed,
in the form of a statistically significant effect of orders received by traders on
the prices at which they transact. (Earlier high-frequency data, e.g., Goodhart's
thirteen weeks of "indicative quotes" obtained from the Reuters screen, did not
include actual order flow or transaction prices [see Goodhart and Figliuoli
1991].)
The alternative interpretation, which often goes by the name noise trading,
is that trading volume can itself generate "excessive volatility" (see, e.g., Tobin
1978; Goodhart 1988; De Long et al. 1990; and Frankel and Froot 1990a). In
a well-known study of the stock market, French and Roll (1986) found that,
when the market closed for election days or special shutdowns, volatility was
not "stored up" to await the reopen of the market, even though the generation
of new information continued. Rather, it seemed, volatility depended directly
on trading volume, holding information flow constant. Global foreign ex-
change markets are open twenty-four hours a day, with the result that a repeat
of the French-Roll experiment is not easy. One attempt is Ito and Roley (1990).
Some of the work in this volume may shed light on the French-Roll hypothesis
that trading volume can gratuitously generate volatility.
Writing quite soon after the beginning of the floating-rate era, McKinnon
(1976) claimed that exchange rates were excessively variable owing to a defi-
ciency of stabilizing speculation. One would think that banks would be the
best candidates to take open positions in a currency considered undervalued
relative to fundamentals and to hold such positions for however many months
it took to correct the "misalignment." Banks are reluctant, however, to take
large positions overnight. Others confirm that, even though typical traders in-
cur high exposure during the day, they try hard to close out their positions
overnight (Fieleke 1981). Lyons (1995) finds evidence of an inventory effect
during the course of the day in addition to the information effect: when the
outstanding position is large, traders modify their bid and ask prices so as to
discourage further exposure in that direction.
In chapter 1 of this volume, Philippe Jorion seeks to test one important mi-
3. More specifically, the data set consists of time-stamped quotes and trades, the marketmaker's
indirect (brokered) trades, and the time-stamped prices and quantities for transactions mediated
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crostructure theory, that of Tauchen and Pitts (1983). The theory says that the
correlation between trading volume and volatility should be positive when the
source of trading volume is disagreement (heterogeneity of beliefs) and nega-
tive when volume is determined by the number of traders, owing to averaging
over larger numbers (liquidity). He finds support for the theory in that the vari-
ance is observed to depend positively on volume and negatively on a time trend
intended to reflect the steadily growing number of traders. He uses options
prices to obtain a measure of the anticipated component of the variance, which
has not previously been studied in this context.
Jorion also looks at the bid-ask spread, the standard measure of transactions
costs. He confirms earlier findings (Glassman 1987; Bessembinder 1994) that
the spread widens before weekends and holidays, supporting the liquidity ef-
fect. He also confirms earlier findings that the bid-ask spread depends posi-
tively on the variance but negatively on volume. (He, like Wei [1994], uses the
option-implied volatility for this purpose. Glassman [1987], Boothe [1988],
Bollerslev and Domowitz [1993], and Bollerslev and Melvin [1994] used
GARCH models of the variance rather than the option-implied volatilities.)
The presumption here is that information is processed efficiently. At a time
when beliefs are particularly heterogenous and therefore trading volume is par-
ticularly high, the presumption is that the market is responding to a rapid gen-
eration of information.
Chapter 2, by Hsieh and Kleidon, casts some doubt on the proposition that
information is processed efficiently. The point of departure is a model by Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer. It features a crucial distinction between well-informed
traders and liquidity traders, some of whom have some discretion as to when
they trade and so seek to trade at a time when high volume drives down the
cost of transaction (the liquidity effect on the bid-ask spread). Hsieh and Klei-
don confirm the correlation of volume and volatility that the Admati-Pfleiderer
model is designed to explain: there is a bunching of volume and volatility at
both the open and the close in the foreign exchange market.
A deeper look, however, uncovers serious problems. First, the bid-ask spread
is observed to go up, not down, at the open and the close, contradicting the
notion that liquidity traders are deliberately bunching at these times to save on
transactions costs. Second, at the close in London, when volume and volatility
are high in that market, there is no detectable simultaneous effect in the open
New York market. This seems to contradict existing models of asymmetric
information, which presuppose a common knowledge of economic structure
despite the existence of idiosyncratic information. If volatility is high in Lon-
don because information relevant to the pound/dollar rate is coming out, then
why shouldn't the same effect show up in the pound/dollar rate in the New
York market?
Hsieh and Kleidon think that the answer lies in models where information
is aggregated imperfectly and inventories are important. They take at their
word traders who explain that, at morning open, they need to get a "feel" for
the market, thus explaining the combination of high trading volume, high vola-Introduction
tility, and high spreads in the morning. Toward evening close, traders are anx-
ious to unload excess inventories, explaining the reappearance of the height-
ened volume, volatility, and spreads.
In chapter 3, Perraudin and Vitale build a theory that can explain why such
a high percentage of trading volume takes place among dealers instead of with
customers. They emphasize that, because the foreign exchange market is de-
centralized, order flow cannot be observed by everyone. This setup differs from
most of the conventional microstructure literature, which was designed for
transparent centralized markets such as the equity markets. Some foreign ex-
change traders acquire useful new information at intervals, in the form of or-
ders from customers. Perraudin and Vitale model the trading process by means
of which this information gets disseminated to the marketplace by dividing the
interval into four stages. Those traders without information seek by their trad-
ing strategy at an early stage to tease out the information from those who have
it. Informed traders in effect sell or rent private information to others. Whereas
the prominent Glosten-Milgrom theory of microstructure says that traders
should quote a wide spread when dealing with someone whom they believe to
be better informed so as not to be "taken in," the Perraudin-Vitale theory ex-
plains why traders would want to quote a narrow spread in such a case. They
want to get the order so that they can derive information that will be useful at
the next stage of trading.
One needs to test such theories of asymmetric information. The Jorion and
Hsieh-Kleidon chapters gave us somewhat conflicting verdicts: the first more
supportive of some theories of optimization subject to asymmetric information
and the second less supportive. In chapter 4, Goodhart, Ito, and Payne suggest
that a good deal of skepticism is warranted regarding such tests because they
are based on "indicative quotes," that is, the bid and ask quotes that are posted
to all potential customers. Traders usually quote better prices to each other
when they transact. Goodhart and his coauthors use data from a new trading
system, the Reuters 2000-2, to compare actual transactions prices with the
indicative quotes ("FXFX"). They find that movements in the two are very
close, with the result that for some purposes either series can be used. But the
behavior of the high-low spread in the Reuters 2000-2 data is quite different
from behavior of the FXFX bid and ask quotes. In other words, one should not
mistake the publicly posted bid and ask prices for the prices at which foreign
exchange traders trade with each other.
Fortunately, Richard Lyons's data set constitutes direct observation of trader
behavior. It contains the time-stamped transaction prices and quantities at
which his trader traded in the New York mark/dollar market. In chapter 5,
Lyons confirms the existence of both an effect of the dealer's inventory on
transactions prices and an effect of a dummy variable indicating whether the
trade was initiated by the buyer or by the seller. These significant effects con-
firm, respectively, an asymmetric-information channel and an inventory-
control channel.
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effect on the transactions price: the effect of the quantity traded. Lyons seeks
to shed light on two competing theories of why trading volume is sometimes
very high. What he calls the "event uncertainty" view is that high trading vol-
ume indicates that information is being processed rapidly. What he calls the
"hot potato" theory is that high trading volume indicates that little information
is being processed; rather, liquidity-trader customers are placing orders with
their brokers, who then unload their overextended positions on other traders,
who continue to pass the exposure like a hot potato. (For this second theory,
he cites the Admati-Pfieiderer model of discretionary liquidity traders, tested
by Hsieh and Kleidon in chapter 2.) The evidence supports the hot potato view:
the quantity traded has a significant effect only when the time between transac-
tions is long. When the time between transactions is short, the quantity traded
has no significant effect on the trader's prices, suggesting that the trader views
these orders as coming from liquidity traders rather than informed traders.
The Chapters in Part II
Part II provides clues as to the potential relevance of microstructure for un-
derstanding exchange rate dynamics, especially in times of crisis. A widely
reported phenomenon during the European currency crises of 1992 was the
use of dynamic hedging strategies that caused increased sales of the currencies
under attack following defensive interest rate hikes by central banks (G-10
1993). Sterling and, perhaps more intensely, the Swedish krona and the lira
were reported to be subject to this source of pressure. The sales were under-
taken by the institutions that needed to hedge short positions in put options on
these currencies.
Standard assumptions of macroeconomic models (in particular, gross substi-
tutability among assets) make it difficult to understand how interest rate hikes
could intensify pressure on a currency. The debate regarding the European
Monetary System (EMS) crises of 1992 and 1993 has pointed to the possibility
that large interest rate hikes aggravate domestic economic conditions (espe-
cially where large debt overhangs are a problem), thus inducing markets to
expect very low interest rates in the future and weakening the currency.
While "wrong" own-price effects are not unknown to macroeconomists, it
should be noted that the economics of dynamic hedging is not related to expec-
tations about the future evolution of exchange rates or other asset prices: as is
well known, arbitrage considerations alone (plus the Wiener process assump-
tion on the underlying asset) are required for deriving the most commonly used
formulas for option prices and delta hedging. The issue is instead closely re-
lated to so-called stop-loss and portfolio-insurance strategies, which have been
extensively analyzed after the stock market crash of 1987 in the Brady Com-
mission (1988) report and in subsequent professional literature. "Portfolio in-
surance" (the behavior that results from aggregating the customer, who holds
a put option, and the bank, which hedges its short option position) is a positiveIntroduction
feedback strategy (buy high and sell low): hence it implies unconventional
own-price derivatives.
The added twist in the case of delta hedging on currencies analyzed in chap-
ter 6 by Garber and Spencer is the extension of unconventional signs to the
interest rate effect. The questions that can be asked are very much the same as
those that have been asked in the stock market literature: to what extent these
strategies are still efficient when the standard distributional assumptions are
violated or there is a likely discontinuity in the market; what utility function
may justify a demand for insurance that appears to be insensitive to relative
prices; and whether mechanical trades are likely to have a major effect on
market prices.
The first question seems to be particularly relevant in the case of pressures
against a pegged exchange rate, when central banks' actions may significantly
affect price dynamics. For instance, applying Krugman's (1991) smooth past-
ing principle to the behavior of the exchange rate within a band yields a for-
mula that implies much smaller sales of the currency under attack than those
implied by the standard Garman-Kohlhagen (1983) model. As to the second
question, it should be recognized that the same bank whose option desk in-
creases the short position in the weak currency to maintain a hedged option
position may take the strategic view that the interest rate hike will reinforce
the currency. It may therefore decide to reduce its aggregate short position in
the weak currency rather than increasing it. The same may be done by the
bank's customer who is holding a long option position. The point is that there
may be a division of labor within large organizations but that the aggregate
behavior of each institution may well conform to more standard economic
assumptions.
Some recent microstructure literature suggests reasons why mechanical sell-
ing pressure by hedgers may instead be self-reinforcing: essentially, other,
poorly informed agents infer from the price drop caused by the hedgers that
an unknown negative shock has occurred and join the selling. According to
Gennotte and Leland (1990), the price effects of this mechanism might be quite
dramatic, even if trades undertaken by hedgers are a small proportion of total
turnover. To avoid this problem, Grossman (1988) proposed to enforce public-
ity of the trades undertaken by certain categories of professional agents so that
other agents may be able to distinguish the actions of hedgers from those that
may be generated by genuine new information about economic fundamentals.
Considerable work is clearly required to assess the practical relevance of
positive feedback trades in the foreign exchange markets, but data are virtually
nonexistent. Central banks and international financial institutions could take
the lead in this area.
The analysis of dynamic hedging suggests the possibility that different
agents respond differently to the same information. The issue of heterogeneity
across classes of operators is taken up explicitly in chapter 7. Bagliano, Bel-
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banks' balance sheets and conclude that there is evidence of heterogeneous
behavior on the eve of the September 1992 crisis. A few main facts stand out.
The net (spot and forward) foreign currency position of the domestic banking
system displays very small changes around zero throughout the entire year
1992. Nonbank residents instead remained net exporters of capital until August
1992, a trend that had started with the liberalization of capital movements and
probably reflected gradual portfolio diversification. The pace of these outflows
did not increase very much in the months preceding the devaluation. On the
other hand, nonresidents continued to be net investors in lira-denominated
assets. Within the nonbank domestic sector, households seem to have taken
positions against the lira, while the evidence on firms is mixed: some seem to
have increased their foreign currency liabilities, especially with domestic
banks, while others increased their foreign currency assets.
As argued above, some sort of heterogeneity, such as dispersion of beliefs, is
essential to understand why trading occurs in any asset market. The interesting
suggestion of this chapter is that there are sources of heterogeneity other than
heterogeneity of beliefs—linked to risk aversion, need for liquidity, and asset
preferences—that may be important in determining the direction and intensity
of trading by different agents. Formal or informal regulatory constraints, espe-
cially on banks, may also be an important factor. Relaxing the representative
agent assumption considerably complicates the analysis, but it may in some
cases usefully complement the standard tools of macroeconomic analysis.
While the relevance of microstructure analysis for exchange rate dynamics
is not yet established, it is clear that macroeconomic tools alone provide unsat-
isfactory explanations, except possibly over long time horizons. This point is
stated with particular clarity by Flood and Taylor in chapter 8. The authors
carefully review the very large body of evidence on major exchange rate mod-
els: purchasing power parity, monetary models, and sticky-price, equilibrium,
and portfolio-balance models. Although at one time or another each of these
models has found some support in the empirical literature, the overall picture
is that, for industrial countries during normal times (excluding periods of hy-
perinflation), conventional macro fundamental models are incapable of ex-
plaining the greater proportion of the variation in nominal exchange rates. In
spite of the very large literature that followed the seminal paper by Meese and
Rogoff (1983), beating the random walk still remains the standard metric by
which to judge empirical exchange rate models. Improvements over the ran-
dom walk have been slight and generally not statistically significant. This is
true whether actual or predicted values of future explanatory variables are used
in the forecasting equations of macro models.
Even for the real exchange rate, it is difficult to beat a random walk model
on conventional data sets, which is often taken as evidence against purchasing
power parity. Permanent real demand and supply shocks may in principle ac-
count for the random walk property of real exchange rates; this is the key point
emphasized in equilibrium models. There is, however, very little evidence that11 Introduction
the large movements that have been observed in real exchange rates can be
explained by real shocks. Moreover, according to equilibrium models, real ex-
change rates should be largely invariant to the choice of monetary regimes, a
hypothesis that seems to be strongly contradicted by the evidence. In particu-
lar, variability of real exchange rates is much larger in floating exchange rate
regimes without there generally being greater variability in macroeconomic
fundamentals (Frankel and Rose 1995).
Nevertheless, some recent evidence suggests that purchasing power parity
has some explanatory power over very long time horizons or across very di-
verse countries. Flood and Taylor add their own piece of evidence to this propo-
sition by pooling cross-sectional and averaged time-series data on twenty-two
countries and twenty years. The interpretation of their results is that simple
macro fundamentals have explanatory power with respect to nominal exchange
rate movements over five years or more. They conclude that further attempts to
provide explanations of short-term exchange rate movements based solely on
macro fundamentals may not prove successful, although the macro fundamen-
tals are important in setting the parameters within which the exchange rate
moves in the short run.
The last contribution of this book, chapter 9, takes it largely for granted that
macroeconomic analysis is only part of the story: it assumes that there can be
self-fulfilling speculative attacks against a pegged exchange rate or, at the very
least, that crises can occur even among countries with an extremely high de-
gree of convergence in economic policies and conditions. The belief of Eichen-
green, Rose, and Wyplosz in this proposition is so strong as to lead them to
state that a European monetary union will not be achieved unless the Maas-
tricht Treaty is amended in one of the following ways. Either it is decided to
eliminate the transitory stage (in which exchange rates are required by the
treaty to remain within "normal" fluctuations margins), or capital controls are
imposed to maintain the required stability in exchange rates during the transi-
tion. Their specific proposal is to introduce a non-interest-bearing deposit on
bank lending to nonresidents. Bank lending is seen as the indispensable raw
material for speculating against a currency.
To support their proposal, the authors provide evidence on the effectiveness
of capital controls. Interestingly, their statistical tests tend to show that, while
capital controls allow countries some greater degree of economic policy auton-
omy, they do not significantly contribute to reducing the costs of resisting spec-
ulative attacks. Reserve loss and interest rate hikes by central banks do not
appear to be smaller when exchange controls are in place. This proposition
may help reconcile two widely held views: one claiming that the EMS survived
in the 1980s because of capital controls (e.g., Rogoff 1985; Wyplosz 1986; and
Giovannini 1989) and another arguing that capital controls are usually ineffec-
tive because they can be evaded (e.g., Gros and Thygesen 1992; and Dini
1994). The underlying microeconomics—the key concern for this book—are
quite clear. Since the legal risks of evading the controls are essentially a fixed12 Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli, and Alberto Giovannini
cost, agents, may be willing to forgo the (moderate) benefits of portfolio diver-
sification in normal times, but the incentive to evade becomes very high when
a large devaluation is perceived as imminent.
An Agenda for Future Research
Our brief survey, together with a more careful reading of the papers and
comments in this collection, provides an argument as to the importance of
research on the microstructure of foreign exchange markets. The increasing
availability of tick-by-tick data in the spot foreign exchange markets and in the
various derivative markets (forward, swaps, options, etc.) yields an inexhaust-
ible source of evidence against which theories can be tested. The literature on
the microstructure of foreign exchange markets is bound to grow significantly
in the near future. We conclude this introductory chapter by discussing the
directions in which this literature is likely to embark.
This research is newborn. It has a long way to go before it can claim to
produce a model of exchange rate determination. After realistic models of
dealer behavior are constructed, the next step would have to be letting such
dealers interact in the marketplace, in order to derive a central tendency to the
torrent of bid and offer quotes and transaction prices in which each individual
deals. That central tendency would be what in macroeconomic models we call
the market-clearing exchange rate. Then the interaction among dealers would
have to be embedded in the larger universe of borrowers, lenders, importers,
and exporters who play a role in the foreign exchange market so that economic
fundamentals could ultimately be brought back in. This is a very tall order.
Even a superficial reading of the papers in this collection should convince
one of the difficulty of constructing a general equilibrium model of the ex-
change rate. A successful combination of microstructure theory and macroeco-
nomic theory appears to be out of reach at this stage. From one standpoint,
however, this should not be a total loss. Information on macroeconomic aggre-
gates like monetary aggregates, gross domestic product, the balance of pay-
ments, and the components of aggregate demand arrive with a frequency that
is much lower than the frequency of trading in foreign exchange markets and
is affected by significant statistical errors. Information about most prices of
manufactured goods and services is affected by even larger statistical errors. It
is perhaps no surprise that these variables have little to do with foreign ex-
change markets and the short-run determination of exchange rates. The relation
between these variables and exchange rates is also not very reliable in the long
run. For these reasons, a theory that forces a tight link between macroeco-
nomic prices and quantities is perhaps not especially needed.
By contrast, there are a number of important questions, confined to the
working of the foreign exchange market, that we find particularly intriguing.
At a minimum, the study of microstructure should provide insight into the
implications of the organization of the market—and in particular its decentral-13 Introduction
ized nature—on the volume of trade, the determination of bid-ask spreads, and
perhaps the volatility of prices.
In addition, theoretical work could help understand the behavior of foreign
exchange dealers and their interaction. These models can help assess the opti-
mality of trading techniques like stop-loss orders (Krugman and Miller 1993),
"chartism" or "technical analysis" (Allen and Taylor 1989; Frankel and Froot
1990a, 1990b; Schulmeister 1987,1988; Goodhart 1988; and Goodman 1979),
and "support levels" (De Grauwe and Decupere 1992). They could ultimately
describe short-run price dynamics and improve our understanding of concepts
such as speculative bubbles and speculative attacks. In the international finance
literature, these concepts are burdened with a considerable amount of implicit
theorizing. Speculative bubbles are often taken to be the deviations of ex-
change rates from fundamental macro models; speculative attacks are viewed
as accelerating movements in exchange rates in anticipation of large changes
in underlying macroeconomic variables. Research on market microstructure
can give new and more useful meaning to these ideas.
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